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Abstract. It is explored how foundational ontologies based on physicalist material-
ism, nominalism, and Peircean semiotics can be applied to represent signs, models
of physical systems, and their use in engineering modelling and simulation practice.
It is argued that to conceptualize modelling of physical systems in such a frame-
work, various kinds of Peircean semiotic triads need to be combined. Thereby, a
sign (representamen) and a represented object either yield an interpretant, i.e., an-
other representamen of the same object, or the representation is transferred to an-
other object by semantic change through metonymization or metaphorization, re-
taining the same symbol. Multiple conceivable ways of implementing this ontolog-
ical paradigm are compared, and a demonstrator implementation is discussed.
Keywords. Foundational ontology, semiotics, modelling and simulation.
1. Introduction
A model of the physical behaviour of a system is a sign: It represents the modelled sys-
tem. Semiotics is the science of representation; a simulation that evaluates a model nu-
merically is a semiotic process – a semiosis. By this semiosis, the meaning of the model
as a sign realizes itself. The present work is concerned with the fundamentally ontolog-
ical task of characterizing what models and simulations are and how to describe this
formally in a coherent way [1]. Since the emergence of methods and tools in computer
science and data technology that rely on ontology-based approaches to knowledge repre-
sentation [2], there have been endeavours to develop ontologies for modelling and sim-
ulation to support the exchange of information both between people (communication)
and between software (interoperability) [3,1]. Solutions that have been proposed include
ontologies targeted specifically at data technology for simulation-based engineering such
as PhysSys [3] and, more recently, the Physics-based Simulation Ontology (PSO) [4], the
Ontology for Simulation, Modelling, and Optimization (OSMO) [5,6,7], the Simulation
Intent ontology [8], and the European Materials and Modelling Ontology (EMMO) [9],
the latter of which is presently available as an alpha version [10]; PSO is a domain ontol-
ogy aligned with the Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) as a top-level ontology [11], whereas
OSMO is aligned with the EMMO [7,12]. In the present work, similarly, EMMO termi-
nology [9,10] will be used as far as possible.
This work is structured as follows: On the basis of mereosemiotic physicalism, an
ontological paradigm characterized in Section 2, multiple possible solutions for address-
ing a series of challenging aspects of designing a foundational (top-level) ontology for
simulation-based engineering are outlined in Section 3. The design space for founda-
tional ontologies pertaining to the paradigm of mereosemiotic physicalism is discussed
in Section 4, and an example implementation, abbreviated EMMO-PIMS (aligned with
the EMMO), is introduced in Section 5. A conclusion is given in Section 6.
2. Mereosemiotic physicalism
The term mereosemiotic physicalism is employed here for a paradigm that is constituted
by the following core tenets:
• Mereology, i.e., one of the fundamental relations is proper spatiotemporal part-
hood P such that a P bmeans “a is a proper part of b.” Mereology can be extended
to mereotopology by including a predicate for connectedness [13,14].
• Physicalist materialism; i.e., only that is recognized as existing which can be con-
ceived of as physically real in the actual world, or at least in a hypothetical world
to which the same laws of physics apply. All that exists is spacetime, in the sense
of conceivably being part of a universe with three spatial dimensions and the di-
mension of time [13,14].
• Semiotics following Peirce, by which signs (i.e., representamina) engage in a di-
alectical relationship with represented objects through a process the elementary
steps of which are conceptualized as triads [15,16,17,18]; accordingly, represen-
tation R, where s R o would mean “the sign s represents the object o,” requires
a third element, in addition to s and o, to function in practice. Accordingly, by
semiosis, an interpretant is generated as a new representamen for the same object.
• Nominalism, by which only individuals (i.e., concreta) exist. Quantification can-
not be applied to classes (i.e., universals, concepts, or abstracta as such), only to
individuals (i.e., to instances or elements of a class), and only individuals, not
classes, can be elements of a class.
This paradigm is inspired by the approach followed by the EMMO developers [9,10];
accordingly, the EMMO developers should be credited with designing the paradigm and
publishing its first and reference implementation. (It goes without saying that any short-
comings of this work are the responsibility of the present authors.) Mereosemiotic phys-
icalism combines a materialist approach that is well suitable for discussing materials
and their properties with semiotics grounded in a complex sign-object interaction. In
this way, intricate scenarios from modelling and simulation as well as their relation to
experimental data can be captured.
Physicalism suggests a view of operating with signs, and a view of thought in gen-
eral, as being constituted by processes that are simultaneously logical, social, and mate-
rial; much of Peirce’s work can be read in this way. This approach contributes to seman-
tic interoperability for infrastructures that deal with multiscale modelling and simula-
tion of physical systems. Computer simulations are processes by which a representamen
(namely, a model) is evaluated, producing another representamen (a different model or a
computed property, i.e., an interpretant), and data management needs to take the material
preconditions of this process into account, since they constitute relevant metadata:Where
was the simulation done, how were the input and the output stored and exchanged, etc.?
Any platform architecture that aims at making models and simulation results findable,
accessible, interoperable, and reusable (FAIR) must include such metadata to a certain
extent [19,20]. Similarly, metadata on the provenance of sensory data are crucial for in-
tegrating “field devices 4.0” into model-driven process control [21]. In this view, such an
approach seems to be well suited for its purpose.
3. Variations within the paradigm
Mereosemiotic physicalism permits describing modelling and simulation as semiosis. In
this way, central concepts from simulation-based engineering data technology can be
given a fundamental function in terms of entities defined in a foundational ontology;
further domain ontologies can then be aligned with the foundational ontology, yielding
a data infrastructure where models, data, and services can be integrated in accordance
with the principles of FAIR data stewardship [19,22,23]. However, the core tenets of this
ontological paradigm also raise issues that are non-trivial to address. They permit a vari-
ety of perspectives, some of which are explored below. In particular, this concerns 1) the
relation between semiotics and physicalism; 2) the relation between triads and dyads in
Peircean semiotics; 3) the role of objects from fictional or counterfactual scenarios and
their participation in semiosis; 4) the equivalence of multiple instances or copies of the
same symbol, data item, or simulation workflow.
3.1. Relation between semiotics and physicalism
Two variants will be considered:
• Semiosis is fundamental (element S1); i.e., it is not assumed that the relation of
represented and representing entities during semiosis can be expressed straight-
forwardly in physical terms. This includes conceptualizations where representa-
tion/semiosis and spatiotemporal parthood are both fundamental on an equal foot-
ing, or where symbolic reasoning is considered on the basis of formal logic only,
without specifying any precise connection to the characterization of spacetime.
• Parthood is fundamental (element P1); in this view, semiosis is a process, i.e.,
a spatiotemporal region, in which any participating representamina actually take
part (and are a part) physically. In a primary semiosis, or perception, defined here
through the absence of a preceding semiosis from which the sign-object relation
is carried over, the represented object needs to be physically present as well. In
the case of a secondary semiosis, or interpretation, the physical participation of
the object in the process is possible, but not required; the representation is carried
over from the previous step, ultimately pointing back to the primary semiosis
where the object was indeed present.
Peirce’s semiotics contains aspects of both elements: It is fundamentally non-physicalist
insofar as it admits the existence of universals; however, it requires a (possibly indirect)
causal connectivity between the sign and the object. It distinguishes between semioses
where the object is physically present and cases where the physical causal relation be-
tween the sign and the object may be indirect. The latter include references to hypo-
thetical entities (permitted by Peirce) which by their nature cannot be a part of a non-
hypothetical process, cf. Section 3.3. Peirce states that every semiosis has a logical pre-
cursor; i.e., in the present terms, that there is only secondary semiosis.
3.2. Relation between triads and dyads
Two types of realizations of the paradigm can be distinguished on the basis of treating the
semiotic triad either as fundamentally irreducible or as non-fundamental and reducible
to a dyadic representation relation:
• Irreducibility of the semiotic triad (element I2). Following Peirce, mere dyadic
representation of the type s R o does not occur; representation can only be realized
in combination with a third element. Hence, the only pairwise relations that can
be asserted in semiosis do not connect the sign directly to the object but, instead,
the sign to the semiosis process, the object to the semiosis process, and the third
element to semiosis process, respectively.
• Reducibility by existential quantification (element E2). Accordingly, where there
is a triad “sign s — object o — interpretant s′,” so that both s and s′ act as repre-
sentamina for o, dyadic representation relations s R o and s′ R o can be inferred.
3.3. Relation between fact and fiction
This relates to modelling and simulation of scenarios that are known not to have occurred,
or of multiple scenarios that contradict each other, e.g., by parameter variation, so that
they cannot all be realized in the same universe or possible world. Ontologically, this
reduces to the question whether the object of a factual semiosis can be counterfactual. A
rough classification is possible, differentiating approaches that permit a combination of
fact and fiction from approaches that negate this possibility:
• Inclusion of multiple modes of existence or multiple possible worlds (element
M3). Such approaches may be referred to as modal or Meinongian [24]. They in-
clude multiple modes in which objects can exist within the same knowledge base
or ontology. This includes Peirce’s semiotics which permits referring to hypo-
thetical objects through signs that are (of course) nonetheless factually present.
• Negation of fictitious entities, or of the possibility to combine fact and fiction (ele-
mentN3). It is assumed that the referent of a sign needs to exist in the same reality
as the sign itself; hence, either both are factual, or both are fictional. In particular,
this includes the understanding according to which there is no secondary semio-
sis [10] – all semiosis is perception (primary semiosis), so that the sign, the ob-
ject, and the third element are all necessarily physically present, which can in turn
be subsumed under spatiotemporal parthood [10]. Something that exists factually
cannot have a spatiotemporal part that only exists in fiction.
3.4. Relation between multiple copies
Dealing with multiple copies of the same data or metadata item is one of the most ba-
sic functions of data technology. It is a prerequisite for any exploitation of semantic in-
teroperability in practice. But under what conditions are multiple signs (e.g., models or
simulation results), or multiple semioses (e.g., simulations) to be regarded as the same,
as equivalent, as similar enough, or as manifestations of the same information content?
How can a unification or subsumption of multiple entities under some shared identity be
expressed when they occur in different parts of spacetime, e.g., on different computers?
Peirce defines different types of signs for this purpose: “the word ‘the’ will usually
occur from fifteen to twenty-five times on a page. It is in all these occurrences one and
the same word, the same legisign. Each single instance of it is a Replica. The Replica
is a Sinsign” [15]. There, the legisign is either a universal, or if it is understood as a
particular, it does not have a clearly specified location as a part of spacetime. Possible
approaches for implementing this within the present paradigm may include:
• Unification by universals (element U4). Multiple concreta can share a feature by
partaking in the same abstractum. This is closest to Peirce’s realism. For an imple-
mentation that is compatible with the nominalist paradigm, a variety of solutions
can be thought of; e.g., classes, sets, or collections may be defined that contain all
individuals that are similar in a certain respect, or an equivalence relation may be
employed to state that its subject and object are replicas of the same item. What
these approaches have in common is that it is externally posited whether two items
are equivalent or not: The strings “the” and “the” are the same word because the
knowledge base states it. It is not possible for one interpreter to recognize them
as the same and for another to believe them to be different.
• Absence of unification (element A4). If whatever exists is spacetime, and exists
as spacetime, different regions of spacetime by definition cannot be the same;
accordingly, “the” and “the” are just different physical objects, one of which is
printed more to the left, while the other is printed more to the right. This corre-
sponds to an ontology that prioritizes mereology over semiotics.
• Unification by semiosis (element S4). This solution proposes that assessing the
equivalence or validity of signs, processes, etc., is a process of pattern matching,
which is a semiosis. Thereby, the sign is a pattern, the object is the item that is
matched against the pattern, and the interpretant is the outcome of the pattern
matching process, which may be acceptance, rejection, or any other assessment
of how the object matches the pattern. If two objects match the same pattern,
they are equivalent in a certain respect; however, this is not externally posited, but
subject to a process of semiosis, and multiple interpreters may disagree.
4. Design space for foundational ontologies
Based on the core tenets of the paradigm from Section 2 and a combination of elements
from Sections 3.1 to 3.4, appropriately chosen, a variety of strategies can be followed
for the design of a top-level ontology for modelling and simulation in engineering data
technology. The choices on how to deal with each of the four discussed challenges can be
made independently; there are no combinations of elements that appear to be impossible
to reconcile with each other. Therefore, the entire product space
{P1, S1} × {E2, I2} × {M3, N3} × {A4, S4, U4} (1)
is accessible, providing a landscape of possible types of foundational ontologies within
the paradigm of mereosemiotic physicalism.
Peirce [15,16] permits a reading that positions him comparably closely to the foun-
dational ontology type S1I2M3U4, as far as such a claim may be upheld for any ontology
that follows nominalism rather than realism. The EMMO alpha version [10] might be
tentatively described as a combination of the elementsP1E2N3A4; this may change in the
future as the EMMO is further revised and developed. As a third way of implementing
the paradigm of mereosemiotic physicalism, the foundational ontology type P1I2M3S4
is considered here (see also Section 5).
Example: There is a (really existing) closed tank o0 containing water at T0 = 300 K
and p0 = 100 kPa. Somebody wants to predict the pressure p1 in the tank if the temper-
ature were increased to T1 = 310 K at constant density ρ , i.e., after a hypothetical tran-
sition that does not actually occur. The tank o1 with water at these different conditions
does not really exist (or possibly, the tank exists, but it is fiction to state that it has these
properties). To determine the desired quantity p1, two Monte Carlo (MC) simulations σ0
and σ1 are conducted using the SPC/E materials relation r for water w. From simulation
σ0, ρ is determined, where o0 and/or the contained water w0 is represented by the MC
model m0 = modelMC(r,T0, p0), using T0 and p0 as boundary conditions; from simula-
tion σ1, p1 is determined, where o1 and/or the contained water w1 is represented by the
MC model m1 =modelMC(r,T1,ρ), using T1 and ρ as boundary conditions.
In S1I2M3U4, r may occur as a sign for w. The models m0 and m1 are instantiations
of r, and the materials w0 and w1 are instantiations of w. Sign-object relations require
a third element as a complement and do not occur dyadically. The main sign-object-
interpretant triads here are m0—o0—ρ (in σ0) andm1—o1— p1 (in σ1). The system o0
is factual, while o1 is fictional. The semioses σ0 and σ1 really occur, i.e., they are both
factual. It is unproblematically possible to state that o1 is the object in the semiosis σ1,
even though o1 and σ1 do not coexist in the same universe (or exist in different ways).
In P1E2N3A4, there is no abstract entity (like w) to which w0 and w1 could be said
to belong. The models and simulation results are spatiotemporally a proper part of the
simulations, i.e., m0 P σ0 and ρ P σ0, for σ0, and m1 P σ1 and p1 P σ1, for σ1. There is
a dyadic representation relation (e.g., R), and statements such as m1 R o1 can be made.
There is only one mode of existence: If o1 occurs as an object, it must exist in the same
way as o0 or σ1 and all other entities exist; it cannot be stated that one of them, the tank
o1, is merely a fiction without turning it into an entirely different object, such as a (really
existing, but inaccurate) textual description of a tank.
In P1I2M3S4, abstractions such as w are conceptualized as patterns, and it is subject
to the judgement of an interpreter whether w0 and w1 conform to w; in the present case,
reasonable interpreters would agree that w0 and w1 are indeed water (w). Models and
simulation results are a proper part of the simulations (same as for P1E2N3A4). Sign-
object relations do not occur dyadically; the semiotic triads are the same as for S1I2M3U4.
It is permitted to state that the semiosis σ1 is factual, while the corresponding object of
semiosis o1 is fictional (same as for S1I2M3U4).
5. Demonstration
As a proof of concept, a demonstrator implementation of the foundational ontology type
P1I2M3S4, named EMMO-PIMS (EMMO-based Physicalist Interpretation of Modelling
and Simulation), is provided here as supplementary material [25]. EMMO-PIMS was de-
veloped on the basis of the EMMO alpha version [10]; accordingly, it intentionally reuses
concepts and relations from the EMMO as well as the VIMMP Primitives (VIPRS) [7];
cf. Figs. 1 and 2 for a subset of the relation and class hierarchies from EMMO-PIMS.
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Figure 1. Relation hierarchy (partial) for EMMO-PIMS, the present demonstrator implementation of the foun-
dational ontology type P1I2M3S4. Arrows represent the transitive reduction of rdfs:subPropertyOf, i.e., an
arrow r→ r′ implies r ⊑ r′; see the supplementary TTL file [25] for a description of the semantics of these
relations as well as the associated domains and ranges. Bold: Relations with an inverse (owl:inverseOf) coun-
terpart defined in the EMMO [10]; italics: VIMMP Primitives (VIPRS) relations [7].
According to Peirce, all that exists is cognizable; following this approach, Cogniz-
able is the EMMO-PIMS top class. In the formalization that mereology is given here,
as mereotopology, connected regions of spacetime (concept Item) are permitted to have
proper parts that are not connected (concept Collection). Obversely, collections consist
of multiple connected components (items) which are related to the collection by mem-
bership [10], a subproperty of proper parthood, isMemberOf ⊑ P; these concepts and
relations are taken from the EMMO [10].
The present conceptualization of semiotics includes two main categories of pro-
cesses, which are included in the present ontology variants as subclasses of Cogni-
tion processes: The first one is Semiosis, defined in Peircean terms (and following the
EMMO). In a Semiosis, a sign s (first representamen) refers to an object o through its
transposition into another representamen s′
σ : s—o—s′ [gσ ], (2)
which is called the interpretant, i.e., a third element that represents the same object; e.g.,
upon reading the phrase “balloon filled with helium,” the reader may mentally visual-
ize such an object. In EMMO-PIMS, both items and collections can equally participate
in semioses in the role of the object (and, in certain cases, in the other roles as well).
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Figure 2. Class hierarchy (partial) for EMMO-PIMS, the present demonstrator implementation of the founda-
tional ontology type P1I2M3S4. Arrows represent the transitive reduction of rdfs:subClassOf, i.e., an arrow
c→ c′ implies c ⊑ c′; see the supplementary TTL file [25] for a description of the semantics of these classes as
well as associated rules and relations. Underlined: Concepts from the EMMO [10]; bold: concepts declared to
be the same as a (differently named) EMMO concept [10]; italics: VIMMP Primitives (VIPRS) concepts [7].
A primary semiosis, where the physical presence and participation of the object is in-
herently necessary, is a Perception, whereas a secondary semiosis, where the physical
participation of the object is possible, but not inherently necessary, is an Interpretation.
In Relation (2), σ is the Semiosis instance and gσ is its Ground in the Peircean
sense [15,16]. The ground is an abstractum in Peirce, permitting the unification of multi-
ple semioses, such as thoughts of different people, on the basis of a shared idea [15,16],
i.e., colloquially, “a common ground;” for the inclusion of unification in the present
nominalist approach cf. Section 3.4. Following Peirce and the EMMO [10], EMMO-
PIMS distinguishes different types of signs, in particular symbols (called Conventional
here, following the EMMO [10]), icons, and indices. Additionally, modes of cognition
are categorized as SymbolicCognition, ImaginaryCognition, and RealCognition, respec-
tively, in line with the the Lacanian triad of the symbolic, the imaginary, and the real;
cf. Balat [26] concerning the relationship between Peircean and Lacanian concepts.
Representation is meaningful only through the embedding of the sign and the object
in a triad and its broader context, including possible further triads, e.g.,
σ ,σ
′
,σ
′′ : s—o—s′, s′—o—s′′, s′′—o—s′′′ [gσ ,g
′
σ ,g
′′
σ ]. (3)
There, σ can be primary or secondary, whereas σ ′ and σ ′′ are secondary (i.e., interpre-
tations), since they inherit the sign-object relation from the preceding cognition process;
these steps are connected by the relation hence (→֒), i.e., σ →֒ σ ′ and σ ′ →֒ σ ′′. A
sequence of semioses is also itself a semiosis; e.g., Relation (3) can be contracted to
σ ◦σ ′ ◦σ ′′ : s—o—s′′′ [gσ ◦g
′
σ ◦g
′′
σ ], (4)
where the semioses are joined together by concatenation. Teleological reasoning is here
represented by Telesis, a Perception of the type
τ : t—a— t ′ [gτ ], (5)
where the sign is the telos t (which can be any Cognizable individual), the object is the
purposeful Action a (the process by which the telos is pursued), and the interpretant t ′
evaluates the outcome of the attempt; e.g., this might be a revised objective that motivates
the next step of action, or it might be a report on how successfully the aim was attained.
A Cognition process that only consists of Semiosis steps can never depart from its
initial object, it only generates a sequence of representamina for the same object. The
second category of Cognition processes considered here, beside Semiosis, is Semantic-
Change, which contributes a complementary aspect to the dialectics of the referent and
the representamen. A semantic change is given by
µ : o—s—o′ [gµ ], (6)
where the object o and the sign s are related to the other object o′, to which the same
sign then also refers. As above, a sequence of semantic changes retains the charac-
ter of a semantic change. EMMO-PIMS includes two mechanisms of semantic change,
adopted from the terminology of diachronic linguistics [27,28,29]:Metonymization and
Metaphorization. In Metonymization, the meaning (representation) is transferred from
one object to another on the grounds of contiguity, part-to-whole relationships, or causal
relationships; e.g., an equation of state that was developed as a model (sign) for a ho-
mogeneous bulk fluid can be re-applied to calculate the pressure drop in a pipe through
which that fluid flows, by which it becomes a model (sign) for a greater whole. In
Metaphorization, the meaning is transferred by analogy, due to perceived similarity;
e.g., an equation of state for octane can be re-applied to heptane on the basis of the
corresponding-states principle, because the molecules are sufficiently similar.
While the present ontology is nominalist, we do not propose “ostrich nomi-
nalism” [30]; through its alignment with the EMMO, the present approach permits
workarounds for including individuals that are analogous to universals in certain re-
spects; e.g., the class of all balloons filled with helium is not an individual (hence, in
nominalism, it cannot exist). However, there is a Collection that contains all these bal-
loons as members. Moreover, the text “balloon filled with helium” can occur as a repre-
sentamen for the respective objects. By combining semiosis and semantic change, com-
plex chains of cognition can be described. In this way, a foundational ontology is pro-
vided that is well tailored to applications in research data management, particularly to
metadata standardization for modelling and simulation of physical systems [5,31].
6. Conclusion
Within the design space discussed in Section 4, the combinationP1I2M3S4 is particularly
advantageous for applications in platform and infrastructure development for multiscale
modelling and simulation of physical systems:
1. The fundamentality of spatiotemporal parthood (element P1) situates models and
materials straightforwardly within a single framework and encourages users to
consider where and how exactly data are stored and simulations are carried out.
2. The irreducibility of the semiotic triad (element I2), where each cognition is a
part of a chain of logically connected cognitions and becomes meaningful only
through this context, has its direct correspondence in the necessity to provide con-
textual and provenance information as metadata to make models and simulation
data FAIR [19,22]. Where data are obtained by simulation, the provenance de-
scription consists of a description of the underlying simulation workflow [5,31].
3. By admitting the existence of entities from multiple possible worlds within one
knowledge base (elementM3), it can be stated that a simulation is factually done,
applying a factually existing model to a fictional scenario that has not happened
(and possibly should not happen, e.g., an accident). Similarly, a process can be
optimized by modelling and simulation, using parameter variation, without im-
plying that all of the simulated scenarios will actually be built in the real world.
4. Unification by semiosis (element S4) encourages the user to state clearly in what
way two instances were determined to be replicas or manifestations of the same
thing, e.g., by describing how theymatch the same pattern or share the same com-
mon ground. It is thus taken into account that it is often ambiguous whether two
implementations of “the same”model or simulationworkflow are really the same.
The round-robin study of simulation scenarios by Schappals et al. [32] demon-
strates this, finding significant deviations between results proceding from what
might be described as equivalent workflows, even for relatively benign cases.
An internal tension within the paradigm stems from the fact that it is based on nomi-
nalism in combination with Peircean semiotics, while Peirce himself held a realist posi-
tion, stating that “modern nominalists are mostly superficial men” and that “the concep-
tion of a pure abstraction is indispensable” [16]. However, as argued above, physicalist
nominalism has aspects that are beneficial for the present purpose, and similarly, placing
semiotics at the core of a conceptualization of dealing with models seems to be adequate.
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Supplementary material. The EMMO-based Physicalist Interpretation of Modelling
and Simulation (EMMO-PIMS) is a demonstrator implementation of a foundational on-
tology based onmereosemiotic physicalism, typeP1I2M3S4, cf. Section 5. EMMO-PIMS
is available in TTL format, supplementing this work [25].
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